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Abstract 
This study has identified the failure events which can result in a fuel spill on the ramp during fuelling, aircraft 
maintenance and defuelling activities. Frequency data has been derived from a review of historical information on 
spills from a number of Nigerian airports . The main consequence of a release of fuel was determined to be a pool 
fire if the spill were ignited. It has been assessed that the risk from aircraft fuelling is not negligible . In terms of 
both individual and societal risk, hydrant fuelling presents a higher risk than fuelling using a refueller. Hardware 
and safety management measures have been recommended to reduce the risk. In some cases cost benefit analysis 
arguments have been used to support the selection of a particular measure. The recommended measures have been 
presented as: measures specifically designed to reduce the major contributors to the risk; and additional safety 
management measures which are not specifically related to the major risk contributors but which need to be 
implemented.  
Keywords: Fuelling operations, Jet A -1, aircraft, AVGAS, Spill, Risk, Assessment. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 BACKGROUND  
The main type of fuel used for both civil and military aircraft is Jet A-1 (a kerosene type fuel). This is a low 
volatility fuel which is more difficult to ignite (i.e. requires a more powerful ignition source) than aviation gasoline 
(AVGAS). The use of AVGAS is becoming confined to light aircraft.  A number of major fuel spills of aviation 
Jet A-1 fuel have occurred at various airports around the world and in the Nigeria, over the last 25 years. Such 
incidents have been reported at Barbados, our own Lagos, Denmark, Antigua, New Zealand and Australia.  Failures 
during fueling operations of aircraft are not uncommon and have included:  
• Underwing couplings becoming detached from the aircraft;  
• Nozzle quick disconnects separating;  
• Vehicle impact damage to hydrant couplers; 
• Failure of hydrant couplers due to incorrect re-assembly after being modified; 
• hose ruptures;  
• Failure of valve or poppet to close; and 
• Accidental disconnection of a coupling after the failure of an interlock.  
The replacement of AVGAS by Jet A-1 in the past was a  significant  factor  in reducing  the risk  during  fueling  
mainly  because it significantly  reduced the likelihood  of ignition. It also reduced the speed of flame spread across 
the spill increasing the probability of escape for the people around the stand.  
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of this project was to carry out a study of the potential risks from major fuel spills on the 
apron at Nigeria airports using Margaret Ekpo International Airport Calabar as a case study. The overall objective 
can be broken down as follows: 
•  obtain  details  of  historical  incidents  world-wide  which resulted in a fuel spill during  aircraft fueling; 
• assess the fire and/or explosion risk from aircraft fueling operations involving Jet A-1; and  
• recommend cost effective risk mitigation measures for implementation at Nigeria   airports. 
 
1.3 SCOPE OF WORK  
The scope of work included: 
• A literature search to identify historical incidents world-wide which resulted in a Jet A-1 fuel spill during aircraft 
fueling; 
• conducting   Risk Assessment of aircraft fueling and refueling using a refueller;  
• Identification of potential risk mitigation measures.  
 
2.  GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF AN AIRPORT 
2.1 TYPICAL AIRPORT LAYOUT  
The type of airport which forms the basis of this study is divided into two main areas, namely, landside and airside. 
This study is concerned with aircraft stands which are located on the airside. A major airport have around 40 to 80 
stands. But it is important to note here that Margaret Ekpo International Airport Calabar has only 4 (four) stands. 
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Taxiways and runway(s) are also located on the airside.  
 
2.2 ORGANISATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH AN   AIRCRAFT TURN ROUND 
The organization at an airport consists of the airport operator and a large number of companies who are providing 
services associated with an aircraft turnaround. A significant percentage of these companies are subsidiaries of 
airlines and/or the airport operator. Like in Margaret Ekpo International Airport Calabar there three airlines in 
operation. This Airlines are Arik Airline, Aero contractors Airline and Air Peace Airline (which started work on 
3rd of August 2015). 
 
Figure 1.showing a picture of two aircrafts, aero contractors and Air Peace at tarmac of Margaret Ekpo 
International Airport Calabar.   
 
The following activities take place during a turn round: 
• fueling; 
• Unloading and loading of passengers; 
• Delivery of food; 
• Engineering and maintenance; 
• Unloading and loading of baggage; 
• Unloading and loading of cargo; 
• Internal cleaning of the aircraft; 
• Provision of fresh water; 
• Removal of toilet waste; 
• Aircraft pushback/head-setting. A ground handling company may undertake all of these activities. In addition, 
more than one ground handling company could be involved in a particular turnaround. Typically, there could be 
between 3 to 5 companies competing to provide these services. To complicate matters further, one ground handling 
company may sub-contract one or more of these services to one or more ground handling companies. This results 
in a range of permutations of services and service providers existing airside. Because of seasonal variations in 
demand, the ground handling  companies  use  a  large proportion  (approximately  50%)  of temporary  staff, who 
are only  employed during  the summer months. The contracts with the airline operator have financial penalty 
clauses for late delivery of services.  For  example  a  baggage  handling  company  may  have  to have  the first 
bag  off the aircraft  within  12 minutes of it arriving  on stand and the last one off within 20 minutes. If the caterers 
are late delivering food they may have to provide the food free of charge. For a short haul flight a turn round has 
to be completed typically in 30 minutes. On a long haul flight it is more likely to be of the order of an hour or 
more. At time under review, the baggage handling company at Margaret Ekpo International Airport Calabar is 
SAHOOL handler and they are the only company at the Airport that is charged with that responsibility. 
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3.  INFORMATION RELATING TO JET A-1 FUEL  







Emergency Action Code CAS 
Number (Kerosene)  
EU Labelling:  
Symbol  




















Mixture of petroleum hydrocarbons, chiefly of the alkane series, having 10 
- 16 carbon atoms per molecule. Cn H2n+2  
AVIATION KEROSENE; JET A; JET A-1; JET FUEL A; JET 
KEROSENE; JP-7; TURBO FUEL  A; TURBO FUEL A-1  







R22 harmful if swallowed 
R38 Irritating to the skin  
R52/53 Harmful to aquatic organisms, may cause long-term adverse 
effects in the aquatic environment  
 
S2 Keep out of the reach of children 
S24 Avoid contact with the skin 
S36/37 Wear suitable protective clothing and gloves  
S43 In case of fire use foam, dry powder, AFFF, CO2 – Never use water  
S61 Avoid release to the environment. Refer to special instructions/Safety 
Data Sheet  
S62 if swallowed, do not induce vomiting:  seek medical advice 
immediately and show this label or container 
 
3.2 PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF JET  A-1  
Jet A-1 is a fuel manufactured from  the kerosene cut of crude oil  which  then  undergoes  other processes,  such 
as de-sulphurization, in order to achieve  the purity  required for aircraft engines Additives  may  be  used  to  
impart some  of the required properties. It is a mobile liquid at ambient temperature.  It is clear water white/straw 
in colure with a characteristic odor. It also has the following properties:  
Acidity/Alkalinity: 
Initial Boiling point:  
Liquid density:  
Vapor density (Air = 1):  
Vapor pressure:  
Solubility                               -Water 
`                                            -Fat/solvent 
 
Surface tension  
Shear viscosity 
Volumetric Expansion  
 
Not applicable  
150°C  
775 to 840 kg/m3 @ 15°C  
> 5  
< 0.1 kPa @ 20°C 
Very Low  
Not available  
 
0.026 N.m-1  
0.0014 kg.m-1.s-1  
1% for a 7.8°C temperature increase  
 
Jet A-1 has a low vapor pressure at ambient temperatures and as such a spill will be relatively slow to evaporate. 
In  addition, the vapor is more than five  times  heavier  than  air  which  will make  it relatively  slow  to disperse.  
 
3.3 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH JET A-1 
Jet A-1  has a low electrical conductivity, making it possible for static electricity to be generated and for charges 
to be accumulated. The degree to which a static charge may be acquired by aviation fuels depends upon many 
factors: the amount and type of residual impurities, dissolved water, the linear velocity through piping systems, 
the presence of static generating mechanisms e.g. Filters and the opportunity for the fuel to relax for a period of 
time to allow any charge generated to dissipate safely to earth. Jet A-1 is more prone to static generation than 
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AVGAS. While all fuels generate static charges, the electrical conductivity of the fuel bears a direct relationship 
to the speed of charge relaxation (dissipation).Aviation turbine fuels contain antistatic additives. However they do 
not work by preventing the formation of static charges, instead they increase the conductivity of the fuel thereby 
considerably shortening the relaxation time. Antistatic additives actually increase the propensity for a fuel to 
generate static as they are an impurity in the fuel. The charge generation is increased as the fuel passes filters, 
strainers, water separators and other equipment. If a conductive object (which is isolated from earth) is in the 
vicinity of the charge generation point before the charge has had time to dissipate safely to earth, it can concentrate 
up and store the static charge until a high-energy static spark results. If a flammable vapor is present then ignition 
may result but this will depend on the energy of the spark and the minimum ignition energy for the vapor. 
Classification for Supply the CHIP 94 Regulations and guidance to the regulations (HSE, 1999a) apply to the 
hazards associated for substances for supply purposes. These regulations have three classifications which apply to 
the flammability of liquids. These are defined as follows:  
 
EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE 
Liquid substances and preparations which have a flash point lower than 0°C and a boiling point (or, in case of a 
boiling range the initial boiling point) lower than or equal to 35°C.  
 
HIGHLY FLAMMABLE 
Liquid substances and preparations having a flashpoint below 21°C, but which are not extremely flammable.  
 
FLAMMABLE 
For liquid substances and preparations 
Having a flash point equal to or greater than 21°C, and less than or equal to 55°C. But also, when tested at 55°C 
in the manner described in Schedule 2 of the Highly Flammable Liquids and Liquefied Petroleum Gases 
Regulations 1972, it supports combustion. Therefore, Jet A-1 is classed as a flammable liquid for supply. This is 
the lowest liquid flammability category. In contrast AVGAS would be classed as extremely flammable. Institute 
of Petroleum Classification The Institute of Petroleum have produced a code for area classification (IP, 1990a) 
which includes a system for classifying petroleum liquids including crude oil and its products into Classes 0, 1, 
II(1), II(2), III(1), III(2) and Unclassified based upon their flash points. Under this system Jet A-1 is classed as 
II(1), as it has a flashpoint in the range from 21°C up to and including 55°C and is handled below its flashpoint. 
In contrast AVGAS is classed as I, as it has a flashpoint below 21°C. Highly Flammable Liquids & Liquefied 
Petroleum Gases Regulations 1972 (HSE, 1972) these regulations (sometimes known as the HFL Regulations) 
require precautions to reduce the risk of fires and explosions, where flammable liquids or gases are stored. 
Precautions include measures to prevent leaks, spills and dangerous concentrations of vapors, and to control 
ignition sources.  These regulations apply when liquids with a flashpoint of less than 32°C, and which support 
combustion (when tested in the prescribed manner), are present at premises subject to the Factories Act 1961. 
Therefore, they will apply to the maintenance hangars and vehicle maintenance workshops. However, with a 
minimum flashpoint of 38°C (by specification) Jet A-1 is not classed as a Highly Flammable Liquid according to 
the HFL Regulations, whereas, AVGAS is.  
3.3.1 HEALTH HAZARD 
Jet A-1 is classified, for supply  purposes as harmful,  as  a  result  of  the  aspiration  hazard  and irritation to the 
skin. Acute  Health  Hazards Toxicity  following  a single exposure to high  levels (orally, dermally  or  by  
inhalation)  of Jet  A-1 is of a low order. However, exposure to higher vapor concentrations can lead to nausea, 
headache and dizziness. If  it is accidentally  ingested, irritation to the  gastric  mucous membranes can lead to 
vomiting  and aspiration into  the  lungs  can  result  in  chemical pneumonitis which can be fatal. Inhalation Under 
normal conditions of use Jet A-1 is not expected to present an inhalation hazard. Skin Jet A-1 is slightly irritating 
to the skin, and has a defatting action on the skin. Eyes Jet A-1 may cause discomfort to the eye. Chronic Health 
Hazards Prolonged and repeated contact with Jet A-1 can be detrimental to health.  The main hazards arise from 
skin contact and in the inhalation of mists. Skin contact over long periods can lead to defatting of the skin, drying, 
cracking and possibly dermatitis. Excessive  and prolonged inhalation of mists may  cause chronic inflammatory  
reaction  of  the  lungs  and  a  form  of pulmonary  fibrosis. Exposure Limit Values Jet  A-1  does  not  contain 
any  components to which exposure limits apply,  however it is chemically  very  similar to white spirit, for which 
the following  Uk  occupational exposure standards apply  (HSE, 2000): Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL) = 
575 mg/m3  (100 ppm) 8-hour TWA value Occupational Exposure Limit (OEL) = 720 mg/m3  (125 ppm) 10-min 
TWA value (TWA - Time  Weighted Average) 
3.3.2. ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD 
Air 
Jet A-1 is a mixture of non-volatile components, which when released into the air will react rapidly with hydroxyl 
radicals and ozone. 
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If released into water, the majority of Jet A-1 will evaporate at a moderate rate but a small proportion will dissolve. 
Dissolved components will be either absorbed in sediments or evaporate into the air. In aerobic water and 
sediments they will biodegrade, but in anaerobic conditions they will persist. Jet A-1 is slightly  toxic  to  aquatic  
organisms  and  contains components which have  a high  potential to bio accumulate, but is unlikely  to persist  in  
the aquatic environment for sufficient time to pose significant hazards. 
 
Soil 
Small  volumes  released  on  land  will  evaporate at a moderate rate, with a proportion being absorbed  in  the  
upper  layers of the soil and be subject to biodegradation. Larger volumes may penetrate into anaerobic soil layers 
in which it will persist. A spill of Jet A-1 may reach the water table on which it will form a floating layer, and 
move along with the groundwater flow. In this case, the more soluble components, such as aromatics, will cause 
groundwater contamination. Mammalian toxicity is expected to be of a low order. 
3.3.2 IDENTIFICATION OF THE PEOPLE AT RISK 
This Risk  Assessment  is solely  concerned with the risk  of  fatality  due  to  fuel spills  during  aircraft fueling.  
There are many other risks associated with fuel spill events, such as the environmental and financial (replacement 
costs for damaged equipment, business loss, cost of remediation of environmental damage etc.) risks, but these are 
not considered in this report. The main groups of people that will be considered in the risk assessment are: 
a)  The fueling operators  
b)  The other ground services staff (ground crew) 
c)  The flight/cabin crew  
d)  Passengers (frequent, typical or infrequent fliers) these population groups must be considered separately as the 
risks to each group may be very different. For example, a typical fueling  operator will be present at a large number 
of  fueling operations during  the course of the year, whereas a passenger  may  only  be  present  a  few  times per 
year. Furthermore, a fueling operator is much more likely to be involved in a small spill than a passenger (who 
may be in the aircraft or in the terminal building) is. 
 
4.1 FUELING OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT AT MARGARET EKPO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT  
The majority of modern passenger carrying aircraft have the facility for receiving fuel either by over wing or 
underwing methods. Over wing fueling is achieved under gravity whereas underwing fueling is achieved by 
pumping the fuel into the aircraft’s fuel tank i.e.  Pressurized fueling.  For this reason, underwing fueling is the 
quickest way of fueling aircraft and the most common method found at airports. Pressurized fueling of aircraft can 
be achieved by one of two methods, namely hydrant fueling or fueling using a refueler vehicle. The particular 
fueling method available at any one airport will depend upon its size and the facilities available. The number of 
fueling operations carried out at airports will depend upon the number of aircraft movements, although not all 
aircraft movements will require fuel. For Margaret Ekpo International Airport Calabar the number of fueling 
operations carried out in 2015 was estimated to be 372,900, of which 100% are fueling using a refueled. The fuel 
to be uplifted to an aircraft can be as much as 50% of the total aircraft’s weight. For this reason the distribution of 
fuel is significant in terms of the aircraft Centre of gravity. 
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Figure 2. Showing picture of me and some fueling operator Refueling of Aero contractors Airline flight 5N-
8JO. 
The CAA’s recommended practices for fueling and defueling operations at airports are designed to 
minimize the potential for fire. These practices are contained in CAP 74. Within this document are measures to 
control ignition sources. CAP 74 is the minimum standard for ensuring safety of fueling operations. In general, 
individual fuel companies and the airlines produce their own fueling procedures which incorporate the 
requirements of CAP 74. Two key areas discussed within CAP 74 are the “fueling area” and the “fueling zone”. 
Fueling Area As a general guide, a fueling area should be sited so as to avoid bringing fueling equipment or aircraft 
fuel tank vents to within 15 meters of any building other than those constructed for the purpose of direct loading 
or unloading of aircraft.  
4.1.2 FUELLING ZONE 
The fueling zone is an area extending not less than 6 metres radially from the filling and venting points on the 
aircraft, and from the fuelling equipment including the hydrant pit when used. These zones do not physically exist, 
as they are not marked on the apron in any way. Potential ignition sources around an aircraft include: 
• Hot surfaces on auxiliary power units (APU);  
• Electrical sparks due to connection/disconnection of ground power units; 
• Internal combustion engines on vehicles;  
• Hot surfaces on aircraft engines and brakes;  
• Electrical sparks due to communication systems, switch  
Gear, radar; 
• Starting engines, operating switches, mobile phones; 
• Static sparks due to the discharge of accumulated electrostatic charges generated during fueling; 
• Welding and cutting operations; 
• Naked flames;  
• Procedural violations e.g. smoking in a ‘No Smoking’ area. Controls to prevent ignition sources within the fueling 
zone include: 
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• Smoking and naked lights are prohibited; 
• Operation of switches on non-intrinsically safe lighting systems are prohibited;  
• Radios, radio telephones, pagers etc. should be certified for use or ‘intrinsically safe’; 
• Fueling operators should not carry matches or other means of ignition.     This includes wearing footwear with 
metal studs;  
• Only authorized persons and vehicles allowed in the fueling zone; 
•  if  an  aircraft’s  APU  is  required to be operating  during  fueling  and the exhaust duct would discharge  into  
the  fueling  zone,  the APU  should be started before the fuel connection is made;  
• Ground power units (GPUs) should not be operated within the fuel zone;  
• Equipment with wheels that are capable of generating a spark should not be moved  in  the fueling  zone; 
• Hand torches and inspection lamps should be certified for use or ‘intrinsically safe’; 
• Electronic instruments on the fueling vehicle are certified ‘intrinsically safe’;  
• Vehicle engines should not be left running unnecessarily;  
• Vehicles must not be parked underneath the wing tank vents;  
• Photographic flash equipment should not be used in the fuel zone; 
• No maintenance work which may create a source of ignition should be carried out; 
• ATC should issue guidance on whether fueling should be suspended during electrical storms;  
• An aircraft’s external lighting and strobe system should not be operated; 
• Connection and disconnection of electrical equipment should not be carried out.  
Where possible, many of the larger airports are moving towards replacing ground power units with fixed 
power supplies attached to the air bridge. This reduces the number of vehicle engines (and potential ignition 
sources) on the stand. It also reduces the level of noise pollution. 
A member of the flight crew is advised to instruct the fueling operator in the event of an aircraft fire or 
engine overheat warning.  In such circumstances fueling should not commence until the cause has been identified 
and it is considered safe to fuel. Similarly, the airline or airline operator should check to ensure that the 
undercarriage is not excessively hot. If it is found to be the case, the Airport Fire Service should be called and 
fueling stopped until the heat has dissipated. From  the  list  of  measures  to  control ignition sources within the 
fueling  zone, it can be seen that there  appears  to be a lot of emphasis made on controlling  electrical ignition 
sources but less on the control of hot surfaces. An  unprotected electrical meter, for example, is less likely  to be 
an ignition source as it would normally  require there to be a fault, however  hot  surfaces  from vehicle engines or 
the APU  running  present an ignition source which is continuously  present.  
 
Control of Electrostatic Sparks 
A bonding line is used to connect the fueling vehicle to the aircraft prior to commencing a fuel transfer.  This is to 
ensure that there is no difference in electrical potential between the two vehicles, which might otherwise cause 
static sparks e.g. when the delivery hose is connected or disconnected from the aircraft. Also, Jet A-1 contains 
anti-static additives to aid the safe dissipation of any static charges which might be generated during the fueling 
process. Control of hot surfaces Surfaces, if they are hot enough, can heat a spill up to a temperature where 
spontaneous combustion can occur.  The above list suggests some measures to control ignition by hot surfaces. 
However, both of the fire incidents in Barbados and Antigua resulted from a fuel spill being ignited by the aircraft’s 
engine just after it had been shut down. Currently, there are no control measures for this source of ignition. One 
fuel company experimented with a cover placed over the exposed hot surfaces at the rear of the jet engine prior to 
commencing fueling, but it was found to be impractical and was abandoned. One way of controlling this ignition 
source would be to delay fueling until the engines had cooled down to a safe temperature. 
4.1.3 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES  
Jet A-1 is classified (for supply purposes) as harmful, as a result of the aspiration hazard and irritation to the skin. 
In  the event of a spill  during  refueling  the  fueling  operator  and  ground handling  staff are likely  to be sprayed 
with liquid and they  are also likely  to inhale vapor.  This short term exposure is only likely to result in short term 
consequences to health. Jet A-1 is slightly irritating to the skin, and has a defatting action.  If it gets into the eyes 
it will cause discomfort. Toxicity following a single exposure to high levels (orally, dermally or by inhalation) of 
Jet A-1 is of a low order. However, exposure to higher vapor concentrations can lead to nausea, headache and 
dizziness. If it is accidentally ingested, irritation to the gastric mucous membranes can lead to vomiting and  
aspiration into the lungs can result in chemical pneumonitis which can be fatal.  
4.1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
Through talking to various airport operators at Margaret Ekpo International Airport Calabar, it has become 
apparent that the main concern arising from fuel spills are the consequences to the environment. With most airports 
now having environmental policies and management systems in place, pollution is very high on the agenda. With 
consent limits being set on discharges to the environment by the Environment Agency (EA) or other relevant 
bodies, the airport and particularly the company involved can be liable to prosecution and a substantial fine. 
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Although Jet A-1 is not particularly toxic there are still concerns about it entering the environment. The main 
concern is that of exceeding Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) and/or 
Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) consent limits. If the fuel enters a watercourse it will be degraded 
either biologically or chemically. This process reduces he oxygen level in the water, damaging aquatic life.  
Depending on the nature of the watercourse, this can be a very significant problem. There are certain components 
of Jet A-1 fuel which have a high potential to bio accumulate, but they are unlikely to persist in the aquatic 
environment long enough to pose a significant hazard. The effects of Jet A-1 on mammals are reported to be very 
low. Depending on the location of the spill and the surface involved (i.e. a spill near the edge of a concrete surface 
or on an asphalt surface) it may reach the soil and cause ground contamination. For small spills the fuel will either 
evaporate or be biodegraded before it can cause a significant problem. However, a large spill may cause ground 
contamination, contamination of ground waters and it could also pollute local aquifers if they are present.  
 
Mitigation measures. There are several ways to prevent fuel spills reaching the environment. These are as follows: 
 
Spill kits.  
By placing spill kits near to fueling operations, they can be quickly used to mop up any spills.  The kits should 
contain adsorbent materials and booms to prevent any spill spreading.  This is a preferred alternative to the practice 
of diluting and dispersing the spill, employed at most airports. 
 
Containment 
Following a large spill, it is quite common for the fire service to use firewater hoses to form a temporary bund 
around the spill to stop it spreading and entering the drainage system.  Fuel clean-up vehicles are then used to 
remove as much of the liquid spill as possible for subsequent disposal off-site.  In  the event of a spill entering  the 
drainage  system, some airports  are  able  to  switch  the  system  over to ‘containment’ mode in order to retain 
the spill within the system.  
 
Interceptors 
Interceptors on the drains should separate jet fuel from the discharge water.  They must be alarmed, adequately 
sized and regularly emptied.  
 
Catchment plans 
 If a large spill was to occur then the catchment plan could be used to determine which drains would be affected 
by the spill. These drains could then be isolated or diverted to stop the fuel reaching the outfall.  
 
Groundwater monitoring. 
Regular monitoring of the groundwater around the site would determine if any spills were reaching the water table. 
 
5.0. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION   
In conclusion, this study has identified the failure events which can result in a fuel spill on the ramp during 
refueling, maintenance or defueling. The main consequence would be a pool fire if the spill was ignited. With the 
development of the jet engine during and after the Second World War, the use of kerosene type fuel, such as Jet 
A-1, has largely replaced the gasoline type fuel known as Avgas. With its much higher flash point, lower volatility 
and much lower rate of flame spread, Jet A-1 offers some safety benefits. It  reduces the risk  of injury/fatality  
during  fueling  mainly  because it  significantly  reduces  the  likelihood  of ignition. It also reduces the speed of 
flame spread across the spill increasing the probability of escape for the people around the stand. However, it must 
be remembered that the Auto Ignition Temperature of Jet A-1 is significantly lower than it is for AVgas. 
The following measures which also incur relatively low cost are recommended and should be 
implemented. Unclear safety responsibilities for turn round activities in the world, the Courts have ruled that 
organizations retain some responsibility for health and safety during activities carried out by contractors on their 
behalf. Relying on standard clauses requiring the contractor to comply with relevant health and safety legislation 
is unlikely to be enough. Clients must take all reasonably practicable steps to assess, co-ordinate, control and 
monitor the work that the contractors carry out on their behalf. This means that airlines, as the clients of the turn 
round operation, have a significant degree of responsibility for ensuring that it is carried out safely. Airport 
authorities have a role to play, ensuring that the equipment and workplace they provide is safe. They can influence 
standards through issuing and enforcing Airport Standard Instructions and should also seek to develop airport-
wide coordination and co-operation, for example through an Airside safety committee which represents the whole 
airport community. Service providers should also play their part, for example by co-operating around the aircraft 
during a turn round, attending Airport safety committee meetings and obeying Airport Standing instructions. 
Airport Authorities need to ensure that ground handling agents train their staff in awareness and understanding of 
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fueling operations. The oil companies should be prepared to assist in this activity; Airport Authorities require a 
more systematic approach to inspection and audit activities to ensure all aspects of turn round procedures are 
regularly assessed, noncompliance’s identified, remedy ablations specified and recommendations properly 
implemented. Systems to check for trends in non-compliances and persistent offenders should be in operation, as 
well as effective sanctions available and implemented in order to deter repeat violations effectively; Airlines need 
a systematic approach to monitoring their contractors (see recommendation 3); It is suggested that Airport 
Authority activities are not in accordance with the requirements of HS(G)65. There appears to be a need for a more 
structured approach to auditing so that a benchmarking system can be established to standardize safety 
management across Nigeria  airports.  The CAA audit of Airport Authorities could usefully be employed to check 
on the adequacy of internal audits. Management Control (applies to all parties associated with a turn round): An 
essential part of any safety management system is the control, monitoring and feedback mechanism. Regular safety 
audits/checks should be performed to ensure understanding and compliance with operating procedures and 
standards. In cases where breaches are observed, application of disciplinary procedures should be invoked. A 
common practice in the working environment is the use of “team briefings” or “tool box” talks. These allow for 
informal discussions which provide positive feedback on problems encountered in the working environment. 
Without such feedback, problems of both the work activity and requirements of the procedures cannot be 
effectively managed. Recording Spill Incidents: No standard spill incident report was available as guidance or to 
use. Consequently, each airport authority or fire service has developed their own format. For any future analysis 
involving fuel spills, consideration should be given to developing a standard format. A simple tick list approach 
could be adopted. Deficiencies found in the spill reports included: no indication as to whether a fueling procedure 
was in progress, method of fueling, incomplete information, estimated spill volume, details of cause etc. 
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